THE REASONING OF INDIVIDUAL IRAQIANS 299

With Abū Yūsuf, came to reject some of the explicit legal thought of their master.

Tr. I, 7: See above, p. 295.

Tr. I, 12: Neither the Iraqians nor the Medinese (Muw. iii. 136) originally put a time-limit to the right of option which might be stipulated in favour of one or both of the parties in certain contracts (khiyār al-sharṭ). Only Abū Ḥanīfa introduced a time-limit of three days; he arrived at this by analogy with a tradition from the Prophet which gives a right of option of three days in the case of a certain kind of fraud in the sale of animals (the so-called musarrat). But Abū Ḥanīfa, in common with the other Iraqians, rejected this tradition as far as the musarrat itself was concerned. Neither Abū Yūsuf nor Shaibānī (Sarakhsī, xiii. 41) followed Abū Ḥanīfa in his self-contradictory reasoning, and both ignored the time limit. Shāfiʿī adopted it, but this time consistently, because he also recognized the tradition with regard to the musarrat.

Tr. I, 36: Abū Ḥanīfa's doctrine is on the face of it stricter and less practically expedient than that of Ibn Abī Lailā, Abū Yūsuf and Shaibānī; it represents an unsuccessful effort at greater systematic stringency. If the argument which Sarakhsī, xiv. 150 f., gives for Abū Ḥanīfa's doctrine, and which comes down to a consideration of sentimental values, is authentic, it is not surprising that this opinion was discarded.

Tr. I, 43: Abū Ḥanīfa tries to arrive at greater strictness and, if we may believe Sarakhsī, xii. 140 ff., at greater formal consistency; but Abū Yūsuf in his later opinion, followed by Shaibānī (Sarakhsī, xii. 137), returns to Ibn Abī Lailā's doctrine which is in itself sound.

Tr. I, 51: Abū Ḥanīfa rejects the customary agricultural contract of muzāraʿa for a systematic reason, but Abū Yūsuf does not follow him in this. In the parallel case of § 55, however, Abū Yūsuf maintains Abū Ḥanīfa's doctrine (above, p. 272).

Tr. I, 76: Abū Ḥanīfa gives formal and technical reasoning against Ibn Abī Lailā, but is not followed by Abū Yūsuf nor by Shaibānī (Sarakhsī, xx. 108 f.). Also in § 83, Abū Ḥanīfa applies rigidly formal reasoning; here he is followed by Abū Yūsuf (above, p. 273). In §§ 92–4, Abū Ḥanīfa takes again a strictly formal view; Abū Yūsuf agrees substantially (ibid.). In § 95 = 228, Abū Ḥanīfa's decision is rigidly formal and even hair-splitting, and Abū Yūsuf reverts to the doctrine of Ibn Abī Lailā (above, p. 274).

Tr. I, 89: Abū Ḥanīfa's earlier doctrine is an individual effort, shared by Zufar (Sarakhsī, v. 190), to achieve material justice, but