Origins of Muḥammadan jurisprudence
Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence
Publisher
Oxford At The Clarendon Press
Publication Year
1950 AH
298 THE REASONING OF INDIVIDUAL IRAQIANS
Single confession of the theft would create a civil debt, and no ḥadd could be applied after incurring a civil debt even if a second confession was made. In a broader systematic sense, this argument is hardly consistent with Abū Ḥanīfa's doctrine in § 104 (below, p. 300).
Tr. I, 227: Abū Ḥanīfa gives good systematic reasoning, besides references to Companions and to Ibrāhīm Nakha'ī.
Tr. I, 243: The doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa is superior to that of Ibn Abī Lailā; his decision and argument anticipate the decision and argument of Shāfi'ī.
Tr. I, 245: Abū Ḥanīfa shows deeper legal understanding than Ibn Abī Lailā; he concentrates more on essentials, and his doctrine is recognized as better by Shāfi'ī.
Tr. IX, 20 and Ṭabarī, 34: Abū Ḥanīfa shows competent systematic reasoning; he distinguishes between a declaratory and a constitutive statement.
Tr. IX, 27 and 33, Tr. I, 201, Ṭabarī, 46: Abū Ḥanīfa considers the territorial limits of the applicability of religious penal law; his doctrine is sound and systematically consistent, and the theory in question is presumably his own achievement. Connected with this theory is Abū Ḥanīfa's reasoning on the 'difference of territory' (tabāyun al-dārain) in Tr. IX, 16, a reasoning which also underlies his doctrine in § 1 and in § 35 f. (where only Abū Ḥanīfa succeeds in being systematically quite consistent).
Tr. IX, 34: Abū Ḥanīfa makes his technical legal reasoning supersede traditions from the Prophet (above, p. 287).
Tr. IX, 41: Abū Ḥanīfa adumbrates good systematic reasoning.
Tr. IX, 45 and Ṭabarī, 120: Abū Ḥanīfa gives good reasoning and makes a sound systematic distinction; at the same time, he takes Auzā'i's practical consideration into account.
Tr. IX, 46: Good systematic reasoning is given by Abū Yūsuf on behalf of Abū Ḥanīfa.
Abū Ḥanīfa's legal thought was, however, not final, and his companions had occasion to diverge from him on numerous points of doctrine. We are not concerned here with such material divergencies between Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions as belong to the development of positive legal doctrine in the ancient Iragian and in the early Ḥanafī school. The following examples are intended to illustrate some of the imperfections and limitations of Abū Ḥanīfa's legal thought in general, and in particular to show how and why his companions, starting
1 See above, pp. 209, 286.
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