300 THE REASONING OF INDIVIDUAL IRAQIANS

it becomes systematically inconsistent. Later, Abū Ḥanīfa returns to the general Iraqian doctrine.

Tr. I, 104: Abū Ḥanīfa introduces a refinement, basing himself on the wording of a tradition which is late; but this becomes systematically inconsistent with his decision in § 196 (above, p. 298).

Tr. I, 107, 110: Abū Ḥanīfa took no account of the official correspondence between judges which always played an important part in practice; by this uncompromising attitude which was systematically consistent (so that Shāfiʿī called it qiyās), but which merely ignored the practical problem, Abū Ḥanīfa avoided the difficulties inherent in Ibn Abī Lailā's solution (above, p. 291). Abū Yūsuf, with more regard for judicial practice, returned to Ibn Abī Lailā's decision, but Shaibānī followed Abū Ḥanīfa (Sarakhsī, xi. 24).

Tr. I, 114: Ibn Abī Lailā had made the good character of witnesses a matter of public interest, so that the judge had the right to inquire into it even if it was not contested. Abū Ḥanīfa made it a private interest of the parties concerned, but this doctrine was not successful because Abū Yūsuf, Shaibānī, and others (Sarakhsī, xvi. 88; xxx. 153) reverted to Ibn Abī Lailā.

Tr. I, 121: Abū Ḥanīfa introduced a rather far-fetched reasoning which was rejected by Abū Yūsuf and by Shaibānī (Sarakhsī, xxvii. 148).

Tr. I, 133: Abū Ḥanīfa's explicit reasoning is curiously short-sighted and pseudo-rational, so that Sarakhsī, vii. 103 f., has to make an artificial distinction in order to justify it systematically. Abū Yūsuf and Shaibānī (Muw. Shaib. 358) disagree. Abū Yūsuf elaborates systematically the principle underlying Ibn Abī Lailā's doctrine (above, p. 293) which he follows in the essentials.

Tr. I, 137: Abū Ḥanīfa is inconsistent because he has not yet fully grasped all the implications of the problem; only Abū Yūsuf does so.

Tr. I, 148: As compared with Ibn Abī Lailā, Abū Ḥanīfa is more formalistic and in fact superficial. Abū Yūsuf and Shaibānī follow Abū Ḥanīfa (Sarakhsī, xi. 150; Comm. ed. Cairo, p. 105, n. 3), but Shāfiʿī endorses Ibn Abī Lailā. Also in the closely parallel case of § 151, Abū Ḥanīfa gives a sweeping and formalistic interpretation, without much regard for the consequences, of a general principle which had already been recognized by Ibn Abī Lailā. In § 152, Abū Ḥanīfa shows again rigid formalism and pseudo-logical thought;