136 FINAL REMARKS ON LEGAL THEORY

52), and Shāfi‘ī is conscious of its precarious character, even when it is used correctly (Ris. 66).¹ As opposed to analogy, Shāfi‘ī groups Koran, sunna, and consensus together under the name of ‘binding information’ (khabar lāzim or khabar yalzam).²

Shāfi‘ī distinguishes between the knowledge of the general public and the knowledge of the specialists (‘ilm al-‘āmma and ‘ilm al-khāṣṣa).³ The former comprises the essential duties (jumal al-farā’iḍ) of which no responsible person may be ignorant; this ‘absolutely certain’ kind of knowledge (iḥāṭa) is explicitly stated in the Koran and transmitted by the community at large in traditions from the Prophet which are related, in every generation, by many from many, so that no error in their transmission is possible. The second kind of knowledge comprises questions of detail (furū‘, khāṣṣ al-aḥkām) on which there is no explicit text in the Koran, which are expressed in traditions less widely attested or ‘isolated’, and which are partly the result of reasoning by analogy and subject to disagreement; this kind of knowledge is beyond the reach of the general public, and not even obligatory for all specialists;⁴ if a sufficient number of specialists cultivate it, the others may consider themselves excused.⁵

Finally, Shāfi‘ī holds that the divine revelation, as expressed in Koran and sunna, provides for every possible eventuality.⁶ He refers to Koran lxxv. 36 and to a tradition which makes the Prophet say that he received no command and no prohibition from Allah which he did not hand on.⁷ From this thesis Shāfi‘ī draws a number of conclusions, including the rejection of the ‘living tradition’, of the consensus of the scholars, and of istiḥsān. Similarly, his theory of legal knowledge connects his doctrines on traditions, consensus, disagreement, and analogy.

On the whole, and notwithstanding the evidence of its