FINAL REMARKS ON LEGAL THEORY 135

The quaternion Koran, sunna, consensus, and qiyās, which comprises the recognized sources or principles (uṣūl) of law in the classical theory,¹ occurs in Ris. 8, but Shāfi'ī's references to it are rare, and he certainly did not put all these four concepts on the same level as sources.

On the contrary, he calls Koran and sunna 'the two sources' (aṣlān) (Umm, vi. 203); everything else is subsidiary (taba') to them (Tr. IV, 52); nothing else can add to or subtract from their authority (Tr. IX, 29). They are peremptory statements (qaul farḍ) to which no question of 'why' applies, and the final authority (al-qaul al-ghāya) by which the derivative statements are to be measured (Ikh. 340). In Ris. 82, Shāfi'ī defends himself against the charge of putting consensus and qiyās on the same plane as Koran and sunna. While recognizing that the decisions deriving from all of them are equally binding, he points out the difference existing between them as sources or bases (uṣūl, asbāb): what is based on the Koran, and on the unanimously recognized sunna, is true on the face of it and in reality (fil-ẓāhir wal-bāṭin); what is based on the sunna, transmitted in 'isolated' traditions, and not unanimously recognized, is true only on the face of it, because an error in transmission is possible; Shāfi'ī also decides on the basis of consensus, and then of qiyās ; but this basis is weaker, comes into play only in the case of necessity, and is inadmissible if there is a khabar, that is a ruling in Koran or sunna.

The sunna of the Prophet, according to Shāfi'ī, ranks below the Koran.³ What is not to be found in the Koran, is to be taken from the sunna and the consensus (Ikh. 3). Shāfi'ī paid lip-service to the overruling authority of the Koran, which he did not recognize in practice.⁴

The consensus ranks below the sunna in Shāfi'ī's opinion,⁵ which is opposed equally to the doctrine of the ancient schools and to the final classical theory of law.⁶ In these last, the consensus guarantees the whole system of law; for Shāfi'ī it guarantees only the result of analogical reasoning (Ris. 65).

Last in Shāfi'ī's hierarchy of sources comes analogy (Tr. I,