SHĀFI'Ī'S REASONING 323

from the Prophet?' It is easy to see how helpless the opponents must have been when faced by Shāfiʿī's insidious arguments and unwarranted assumptions.

Most of the faults in Shāfiʿī's reasoning can be traced to this particular cause, or to the main thesis of his new legal theory, that is to say, to his dependence on traditions from the Prophet. This dependence which makes it impossible for Shāfiʿī to reject straightforwardly any tradition from the Prophet without the authority of another tradition from the Prophet to the contrary, and this only under strict safeguards,¹ is responsible for many bad arguments and arbitrary interpretations. Here again, I can give only a few examples which lend themselves to short comment.

Tr. III, 7: The distinction by which Shāfiʿī seeks to harmonize between two traditions goes directly against their wording; Shāfiʿī finds his distinction confirmed by the relative chronology of the two traditions, and he rules out repeal.

Tr. III, 16: Shāfiʿī draws an unwarranted conclusion from the text of a tradition, and even claims it as its obvious meaning; he has no reply to the arguments of the opponents; his unwarranted conclusion corresponds in fact to the doctrine of traditions from Companions (Mud. xiii. 48).

Tr. IX, 44: Shāfiʿī interprets a tradition arbitrarily, so as to make it relevant to his problem.

Ris. 33: Shāfiʿī reasons arbitrarily and unconvincingly in favour of his theory that the sunna never contradicts but only explains the Koran.²

Ikh.: A treatise of late composition but containing early passages; it has numerous examples of faulty reasoning which can be attributed to the various causes discussed so far. On pp. 166 ff., in an early passage, Shāfiʿī argues in the style of the ancient schools, acts against his own principles, and minimizes traditions that go against his doctrine in a very prejudiced and arbitrary manner; he can adduce no tradition from the Prophet in favour of his own doctrine, and gives only far-fetched conclusions; the context shows that he chose his doctrine because of the systematic difficulties of the opposite opinion, and that his technical legal thought caused him to interpret traditions arbitrarily. On pp. 244 ff., in another early passage in which Shāfiʿī uses the old idea of consensus,³ his interpretation of traditions is equally arbitrary and unconvincing, and at variance with his own methodical requirements; in this case it is a major