320 SHĀFI'Ī'S REASONING

Shāfi'ī's systematic reasoning has its limitations. We have noticed that it breaks down occasionally over irrational traditions which cannot be systematized and which Shāfi'ī feels himself nevertheless bound to follow. In other cases we find that the very institutions which Shāfi'ī discusses, defy rationalizing.

Tr. I, 88: Shāfi'ī, in an excellently reasoned argument, charges Abū Ḥanifa and Abū Yūsuf with inconsistency and arbitrariness; but within the framework of Muhammadan law the doctrine of Abū Ḥanifa and his followers on the acts of a person during his mortal illness is consistent enough, and the argument in its favour given by Sarakhsī, xviii. 26 f., is impressive; the whole idea is inconsistent in itself, and this detracts from Shāfi'ī's argument.

Tr. III, 44: Shāfi'ī shows himself strictly consistent and definitely superior to Ibn Qāsim (Mud. iv. 147); he only overlooks the fact that a choice is often given in Muhammadan law in comparable circumstances without the enforcement of the logical alternative which he presses home ruthlessly; his systematic reasoning is too uncompromising for the legal material as he found it.

Tr. VIII, 3: Shāfi'ī is more consistent than the Medinese, but shows himself sophistical and hair-splitting in his argument against Shaibānī; his urge towards systematic consistency breaks down over the irrational character of the traditional doctrine.

Tr. VIII, 6: See below, p. 324.

Ikh. 44: Shāfi'ī draws a specious parallel between the fact that some fornicators are not flogged [but lapidated], and the fact that some thieves do not have their hands cut off [if they steal less than the minimum value which makes the ḥadd punishment applicable]; his systematic reasoning breaks down.

Ikh. 356: Shāfi'ī is hard put to it to invalidate a serious systematic objection of his Iraqian opponent; he tries to rationalize the irrational.

Apart from these natural limitations of Shāfi'ī's systematic reasoning by the material to which he was bound, it is rare to find him systematically inconsistent or reasoning loosely. We have seen that he recognized, in the final stage of his doctrine, only analogy and strict systematic reasoning, to the exclusion of ra'y and istiḥsān, and regarded this even as a religious duty.¹ It is exceptional for a material consideration to interfere with Shāfi'ī's consistent legal thought.² It took him time, of course,