318 SHĀFI'Ī'S REASONING

separating the moral and the legal aspects, whenever both arise with regard to the same problem.¹ On the other hand, Shāfiʿī's fundamental dependence on formal traditions from the Prophet implies a different formal way of Islamicizing the legal doctrine. We have seen that Shāfiʿī in his legal theory distinguishes sharply between the argument taken from traditions and the result of systematic thought.² In his actual reasoning, however, both aspects are closely interwoven, Shāfiʿī shows himself tradition-bound and systematic at the same time, and we may consider this new synthesis typical of his legal thought. We have already noticed cases in which Shāfiʿī's reasoning is Islamicizing, and at the same time systematizing rather than technically legal, and the following examples will give additional evidence of the intimate connexion of the two aspects.

Tr. I, 15: In Shāfiʿī's reasoning traditional and systematic considerations become blended for the first time; he makes an exception from a general rule on account of the sunna of the Prophet in favour of the validity of a stipulated manumission, and at the same time establishes systematically the exceptional character of manumission itself.

Tr. I, 133: Shāfiʿī's qiyās is better than that of Abū Yūsuf, but essentially Shāfiʿī's doctrine is based on traditions as appears from Ikh. 368 ff., particularly 383 ff.

Tr. I, 167: See above, p. 285.

Tr. I, 193: Shāfiʿī combines an argument drawn from a tradition with systematic reasoning.

Tr. III, 48: Shāfiʿī interprets a tradition from the Prophet strictly and consistently, and at the same time gives a general systematic argument and excellent technical reasoning against a Medinese concession to commercial practice.

Tr. VI, 266: Shāfiʿī gives technical legal reasons, besides the argument drawn from consensus, on several problems; see also below, p. 324.

Tr. IX, 19: Shāfiʿī is the first to base his doctrine on traditions; he shows the weak point in Abū Yūsuf's reasoning and introduces a distinction; he creates a consistent theoretical structure for his tradition-bound doctrine, without paying regard to the inconclusive material considerations and to the practice on which Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf on one side, and Auzāʿī on the other, were still dependent.