CHAPTER 6

SHĀFI'Ī'S REASONING

WE have seen in the first part of this book that Shāfi‘ī’s legal theory, and therefore also his positive legal doctrine, represent a ruthless systematic innovation, based on formal traditions from the Prophet as against the ‘living tradition’ of the ancient schools of law. Shāfi‘ī’s legal theory is much more logical and formally consistent than that of his predecessors whom he blames continually for what appears to him as a mass of inconsistencies. Explicit legal reasoning occupies a much more prominent place in Shāfi‘ī’s doctrine than in that of any of the earlier lawyers, even if we take differences of style and of literary form into account.¹

The great progress in legal thought achieved by Shāfi‘ī over his predecessors and contemporaries has become clear from many passages discussed in the preceding chapters; the following examples are intended to complete the picture, and also to illustrate those relatively few cases in which Shāfi‘ī merely reproduces the thought of others, or those, still more exceptional, where he represents a regress in reasoning.

Tr. I, 2: Shāfi‘ī shows himself strictly consistent and rejects an allowance for vis maior which Abū Yūsuf had made (above, p. 112); one of the two possible consistent opinions leads to a systematic difficulty, Shāfi‘ī therefore eliminates it and chooses the other.

Tr. I, 32, 62, 71, 194, 237: Shāfi‘ī introduces important distinctions into the discussion for the first time.

Tr. I, 44: An argument which Sarakhsī (v. 78) attributes to Shaibānī is superior to Shāfi‘ī’s reasoning (above, p. 271).

Tr. I, 75: Shāfi‘ī has nothing substantial to add to Ibn Abī Lailā’s argument, but deepens the reasoning appreciably.

Tr. I, 78, 124, 147, 152, 212, 215, 222, 226: Shāfi‘ī arrives at full systematic consistency for the first time.

Tr. I, 97: Shāfi‘ī agrees essentially with Abū Ḥanīfa, but introduces a relevant refinement of procedure.

Tr. I, 107=110: Shāfi‘ī gives sound systematic reasoning against Ibn Abī Lailā and agrees himself, by implication, with Abū Ḥanīfa; but his reasoning is more penetrating than that of Abū Ḥanīfa.