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Origins of Muḥammadan jurisprudence

Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence

Publisher

Oxford At The Clarendon Press

Publication Year

1950 AH

THE REASONING OF INDIVIDUAL IRAQIANS 307

Loose and secondary argument in favour of an old Iraqian doctrine (Āthār A.Y. 94; Muw. Shaib. 45).

Tr. VIII, 5, 21: Shaibānī first gives arguments from traditions, then adds systematic reasoning.

After Abū Yūsuf’s reaction from Abū Ḥanīfa’s reasoning, Shaibānī frequently returns to Abū Ḥanīfa’s doctrine.¹ He also introduces technical improvements into the doctrine of his predecessors.

Āthār Shaib. 22: Shaibānī gives good systematic reasoning which represents a marked progress over the doctrine as expressed in a Kūfian tradition which Abū Ḥanīfa relates with the isnād Ḥammād—Ibrāhīm Nakhaʿī—Ibn Masʿūd (also in Āthār A.Y. 607). In Muw. Shaib. 244 Shaibānī attributes this reasoning to Maṣruq, one of the Companions of Ibn Masʿūd; this is certainly not authentic.

Āthār Shaib. 61: Shaibānī adds reasoning of a more technically legal kind to that of the ancient Iraqians which was attributed to Ibrāhīm Nakhaʿī (above, p. 237). In the rest of the section, on a parallel case, Shaibānī disagrees with the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa—Ḥammād—Ibrāhīm because of the same technically legal reasoning, and shows himself systematically consistent.

Siyar, i. 244: Shaibānī takes up and elaborates Abū Ḥanīfa’s competent reasoning which Abū Yūsuf had neglected (Tr. IX, 20).

Siyar, ii. 176: Shaibānī refutes Abū Ḥanīfa’s crude analogical reasoning with an argument which is better than the argument of Abū Yūsuf (Tr. IX, 3 (a)).

Siyar, ii. 260: Shaibānī’s doctrine shows a shift of emphasis compared with that of Abū Yūsuf; it is also more conciliatory (Tr. IX, 2).

Tr. VIII, 15: Shaibānī adds a systematic argument in favour of the Kūfian doctrine (above, p. 281).

On the problem of Tr. I, 28, Shaibānī improves on Abū Ḥanīfa and anticipates Shāfiʿī (above, p. 284).

Shaibānī used arbitrary personal opinion (raʾy) to the extent usual in the ancient schools of law, and in particular in order to eliminate traditions which he did not accept.² But most of the reasoning in Shaibānī that appears under the name of raʾy is in fact qiyās, that is strict analogy or systematic reasoning. This systematic reasoning is the feature most typical of Shai-

1 e.g. Tr. I, 103 (above, p. 297), 107 and 110 (above, p. 300), 126 (above, p. 274). On the other hand, on the problems of Tr. 1, 32 and 133, Shaibānī follows the doctrine of Abū Yūsuf, as against the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfa (Sarakhsī xxx. 140 f. and vii. 103 f.).
2 See above, pp. 105, 112.

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