296 THE REASONING OF INDIVIDUAL IRAQIANS

Tr. I, 253: A loose and clumsy analogy, brilliantly refuted by Shāfiʿī.

Tr. IX, 3: Abū Ḥanīfa’s argument reproduces a crude and primitive analogy which is obviously older than Abū Ḥanīfa himself (see above, p. 109).

More significant than these features which connect Abū Ḥanīfa’s reasoning with the period of his predecessors are those numerous cases which show Abū Ḥanīfa’s legal thought not only more broadly based and more thoroughly applied than that of Auzāʿī and Ibn Abī Lailā, but technically more highly developed, more circumspect, and more refined.

Muw. Shaib. 331: In common with the other Iraqians, Abū Ḥanīfa forbids the re‑sale of any object before taking possession,¹ but he is alone in exempting immovables; this distinction is legally sound because of the exceptional character of the possession of immovables.

Tr. I, 13: Abū Ḥanīfa easily refutes Ibn Abī Lailā (above, p. 270 f.).

Tr. I, 25: Abū Ḥanīfa’s analysis goes deeper than that of Ibn Abī Lailā (above, p. 271).

Tr. I, 28: Abū Ḥanīfa shows a higher degree of technical legal reasoning than Ibn Abī Lailā (above, p. 284).

Tr. I, 44: Abū Ḥanīfa refutes Ibn Abī Lailā by better systematic reasoning (above, p. 271).

Tr. I, 60 f.: Abū Ḥanīfa shows a high standard of technical legal thought (above, p. 272).

Tr. I, 65: Abū Ḥanīfa gives remarkably sharp‑sighted legal reasoning: “A man leaves a deposit with another; a third person comes forward and claims the deposit besides the [original] depositor; the depositary says: ‘I do not know which of you two has left this deposit’, and refuses to take the oath [that it is not the deposit of either of them], and neither of them can produce evidence. Abū Ḥanīfa used to decide as follows: the depositary must return the deposit to them both, it is then their joint property, and he becomes responsible to them both for another, equal amount which is due to them in equal shares, for through his ignorance he has destroyed what was given in deposit. Consider [what would happen] if he said: ‘This man has left the deposit with me’, and said afterwards: ‘I made a mistake, it was this other man’; he would then have to return the deposit to the man in whose favour he made the first acknowledgement, and would become responsible to the other for an