CHAPTER 3

AUZĀ'Ī'S REASONING

WE have already given an account of the extent to which Auzā'ī uses explicit systematic reasoning; it is overshadowed by his reliance on the 'living tradition'. This concept, as Auzā'ī understands it, is the result of scrutiny, by the scholars, of the idealized practice. We are therefore justified if, in order to gain some idea of the quality of Auzā'ī's legal thought, we not only draw on his explicit systematic reasoning, but consider the whole known body of his doctrine.¹ It remains uncertain, however, how much of it is Auzā'ī's own, and how much he took over from his predecessors. Auzā'ī (and this may include the Syrians in general) was certainly influenced by Iraqian reasoning, not only in legal theory,⁴ but in the solution of at least one particular problem as well.⁵

Auzā'ī's opinions, as a rule,⁶ represent the oldest solutions adopted by Muhammadan jurisprudence, whether he maintains the current practice,⁷ or regulates it,⁸ or Islamicizes it as is usual with him, or gives a seemingly simple and natural decision as yet untouched by systematic refinements.⁹ The archaic character of Auzā'ī's doctrine makes it likely that he, who was himself a contemporary of Abū Hanīfa, conserved the teaching of his predecessors in the generation before him.

When the doctrine which goes under the name of Auzā'ī was formulated, the Islamicizing and systematizing tendencies of earliest Muhammadan jurisprudence had, it is true, already started to act, but they were still far from having permeated the whole of the raw material offered by the practice. The doctrine as given by Auzā'ī therefore often appears inconsistent.

This inconsistency is perhaps most immediately noticeable in the case of Islamicizing: a strong tendency to Islamicize is