IN EARLY MUHAMMADAN LAW 227

where it was put into the mouth of Ibn Mas'ūd whose opinion, it was claimed, coincided with a decision of the Prophet.¹ A literal interpretation of Koran ii. 236 and xxxiii. 49, however, seemed to imply that the wife in this case had no right to ṣadāq. This was indeed the opinion of an Iraqian opposition group who put their doctrine into the mouth of 'Alī, but did not succeed in changing the teaching of the Iraqian school.² It did prevail in Hijaz where it was projected back to Ibn 'Umar and Zaid b. Thābit; the form of the tradition shows the resistance which this doctrine had to overcome.³

On the problem of giving battle to unbelievers who shield themselves behind Muslim infants,⁴ Auzā'ī refers to Koran xlviii. 25. But the passage is not at all relevant and is obviously an argument on second thoughts against the opposite opinion which clearly reflects the rough-and-ready practice.

Even as regards questions which presuppose the rules given in the Koran, we notice that anything which goes beyond the most perfunctory attention given to the Koranic norms and the most elementary conclusions drawn from them, belongs almost invariably to a secondary stage in the development of doctrine. Problems of this kind which have been discussed before, are 'idda and re-marriage, the presumption of intercourse, the oath of abstinence, and—from the law of inheritance—the share of the grandfather.⁵ We shall have occasion later to discuss the problems of temporary marriage, of the mukātab slave, and of booty taken by a private raider.⁶