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Origins of Muḥammadan jurisprudence

Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence

Publisher

Oxford At The Clarendon Press

Publication Year

1950 AH

AND PERSONAL OPINION 129

of religion to istiḥsān, qiyās, or naẓar (Ibn Qutaiba, 103). They are weak in systematic reasoning, and Shafi'i charges them with wilful ignorance.1 The following details on their doctrine are taken from Ibn Qutaiba.

Ibn Qutaiba spurns systematic reasoning (qiyās and ḥujjat al-'aql) even as an additional argument (p. 234). He concedes that ra'y on the details of law, on which there is no explicit enactment, is less important than the neglect of the Koran and of the traditions from the Prophet; but the right way to arrive at general rules, main duties, and sunnas is not by qiyās and human reasoning (p. 68). How can qiyās apply to the details when it does not agree with the principles (p. 70)? Ibn Qutaiba gives examples where qiyās does not apply (pp. 71 ff.). On the other hand, Ibn Qutaiba recognizes that the Companions used their discretion (ẓann, ijtihād al-ra'y) on questions which were not settled by the Koran and by traditions from the Prophet (p. 367), and he justifies this by saying that they were the leaders of the community (p. 30). Finally, he concedes that there are forbidden things which are prohibited neither in the Koran nor in the sunna, but for which man is left to his instinct (fitra) and his nature (p. 342 and elsewhere).

H. TRADITIONS AGAINST HUMAN REASONING IN LAW

Goldziher has shown that ra'y meant originally 'sound opinion', as opposed to an arbitrary and irresponsible decision.2 But since the activity it denoted was purely human and therefore fallible, it soon acquired, in polemics, the derogatory meaning of 'arbitrary opinion', particularly when it was opposed to the doctrine of the forebears and the sunna of the Prophet. We find this derogatory meaning present already in the dogmatic treatise ascribed to Ḥasan Baṣrī.3 This does not prevent those who reproach their opponents with ra'y from using it themselves.

A further step is represented by the objection to ra'y and qiyās on principle, an objection which, as Goldziher has seen,4 is secondary and posterior to their general use. The anecdotes

¹ Ikh. 323, 367 f. (quoted above, p. 56 f.). ² Ẓāhiriten, 10.
³ See above, p. 74. Ibn Muqaffaʿ, Ṣaḥāba, 120, opposes raʾy to [authoritative] information (khabar).
Ẓāhiriten, 13 ff.

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