AND PERSONA; OPINION 127

Shāfi'ī and ijtihād

'The use of qiyās is ijtihād' (Tr. VII, 272 f.); or even: 'Qiyās and ijtihād are two terms with the same meaning; on all problems which confront the Muslim there is either a binding decision or an indication of the right solution; this must be sought by ijtihād, and ijtihād is qiyās' (Ris. 66). Ijtihād is the preliminary of qiyās, and opposed to arbitrary istiḥsān (Tr. IV, 253). It implies reasoning, is based on indications, and excludes following one's own whims and preferences (Tr. VII, 274 f.). It is obligatory, and in exercising it one obeys Allah's commands (Ris. 5). It is obvious that Shafi'ī opposes his ijtihād of qiyās to the Iraqian ijtihād al-ra'y,¹ and in Tr. III, 61, he also rejects the Medinese idea of ijtihād or discretion.²

Shāfi'ī gives his detailed theory of ijtihād, which is in many respects similar to that of qiyās, in the two main passages, Tr. IV, 253 f., and Tr. VII, 272 ff. The decisions on those points on which there exists no text in the Koran, no sunna, and no consensus, and on which a conclusion by analogy must be drawn from Koran or sunna, are also covered by the general authority of Allah, because ijtihād is vouched for by Koran and sunna. The Koran authorizes ijtihād when it prescribes finding the direction of the Ka'ba from the indications given by the stars, &c. (Koran ii, 144, in conjunction with vi. 97; xvi. 16), but not arbitrarily, or verifying the good character of witnesses from outward criteria (Koran ii. 282, in conjunction with lxv. 2), without regard to their hidden character.³ The sunna authorizes ijtihād in the traditions on the Prophet and Mu'adh,⁴ and on the single and double reward of the mujtahid.⁵ No one may give an opinion on law except by ijtihād, that is, qiyās as opposed to ra'y or istihsān, and he who is not qualified by the knowledge of Koran, traditions, and consensus, on which he must base his ijtihād, has no right to an opinion. The parallel of the opinions of experts on questions of fact⁶ applies to ijtihād as well as to qiyās. It is agreed that in the former generations judges gave judgments and muftis decisions on points on which there was